Transcription:
Hooker's Campaign
On the 27th of April, after more
than five months of inaction, the
main body of infantry comprising Gen. Hooker's1
Grand Army commenced its movement.
Great preparations had been made. No
army in the world was better armed,
clothed or equipped. The force consisted
of 150,000 men with not less than
300 pieces of artillery, Pontoon trains;
Engineers, Battalion ambulance trains,
wagons and pack mules were in the
greatest abundance. All the vast resources
of the nation -- intellect, money, skill and
everything which could be suggested
to make an army strong, and confident,
was lavished without stint. All through
the winter drills, reviews, Schools and
Military Boards had been kept up. The
discipline of the troops & their general
bearing was excellent. No one can dispute
this.
The plan, evidently, was to make
a strong feint on the enemy's left, &
then to attack on the centre and
right. The 1st 6th 2d & a part of the 2d
Corps remained to make the feint
and centre attack while the 5th, 11th
12th 2d3d & 2d Corps & a very large
force of cavalry moved up the river
to cross at Banks Ford, United States
Ford & Kelly Ford .

-----------------1 Major General Joseph Hooker, then commander of the Army of the Potomac. Kelly's Ford.
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The 2d Corps, with the exception of Gen
Gibbons 1 Division -- marched out of camp
about sunrise on the morning of the
29 8th th -- the troops appearing in fine
spirits. I am sure that the 5th Reg't was
never in better fighting condition.
Each man carried five day's rations
of sugar, coffee bread & salt, in his
knapsack, and three days full
rations in haversacks. The weight
of the knapsacks averaged about
23 pounds. 60 rounds of ammunition was carried by each man.
No wagons or tents were taken by Regts.
About 4 miles from the
camp the Corps halted. I was sent
out with my own Regt & the 81st Pa
to picket houses and roads to United
States ford, in order to prevent information going to the enemy. In this way,
we kept up a constant communication
from Gibbons Division to United States
Ford -- about 8 miles. My command
after a severe march in the rain, finished its position. My Reg't occupied
27 dwelling houses, Col McKean's
Reg't 14 houses & some roads. We
found the people very generally full
of smothered rebellion, but very quite
Civil. The 5th, 11th, & 12th Corps
in the meantime pushed on. The
2d Corps sent out heavy details to
open and repair roads.
I remained with
my command until the afternoon of the

-----------------1 John Gibbon (1827-1896), once commander the Iron Brigade, rose to command of the Second Division of First Corps.

After recovering from wounds received at Fredericksburg, he was transferred to command of the Second Division of
Hancock's Second Corps. Warner, Generals in Blue, 171-172.
2 Henry Boyd McKeen was colonel of the 81st Pennsylvania. Walker, History of the II Corps, 144, 172.
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30th when I received orders to move
on after the Division which had crossed the
rivers, and guard the corps supply trains
and ambulances. The day before, two
men came into my lines, saying they
were spies of Gen Hooker. They stated
that they had just come from the other
side of the river -- that the enemy were
fully informed of our movements, &
prepared for us; they also stated that
Gen Hooker would find himself in
a "tight place" -- that no fight would
be made until we were five or six
miles from the river, and then Stuart
would try to cut us off. These statements
proved true.
I reached the wagon
in the evening & was joined by the
88th 66th New York -- a portion of the Irish
Brigade. I found the corps had moved
on across the river, so my command
bivouacked. At 9 o'clock next day, May
1 I started, crossed the river and
made the best of the way to the front.
The road was very bad -- mostly through
woods, & blocked by trains and artillery.
About 4 12 o'clock fighting commenced,
& increased until 3 when it stack
slackened. My command arrived on
the ground about 4 o'clock -- just
as orders were given to the reserve
artillery to move back and cover Banks
ford. We found Hancock's position
was in the front line, & were at
once marched to join him. After con-
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siderable marching we halted to get
supper & instantly after marched
up to a road leading from Gen Hooker's
headquarters to Fredericksburg, & placed
in order of battle. General Geary's Division
on my right had just repulsed a strong
attack of the enemy.
I formed my line
with the 88th on my right 81st in
the centre & 5th NH on the left. The
enemy soon opened a complete enfilading
fire on us, but fired too high. About
2 o'clock in the morning orders came to
move, we marched about 800 yards to
the right into an open field fronting
a piece of forest, & again formed
line of battle -- this time the 5th NH on
my right. Our line then was as follows
[Hooker diagram one]
Gen Hancock ordered me to throw
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up a rifle pit and sent me 89 shovels
and 50 picks and one dozen axes -- for about
1000 600 men to work with. However, we
went to work in earnest and completed our fortification in just 40
minutes by the watch! We were scarcely
done when the rebel batteries opened, throwing
shell, solid shot, iron wedges, and
bundles of rasps! Several balls passed
through our breastworks and two men
were badly wounded.
The door wore away with
occasional shelling, until about 3
o'clock when Williams Division
of Slocums Corps pressed into the woods
in good style, but was soon driven
out in disorder. Gen Slocum sat on
his horse near where I was standing
and as some of the green troops came
out, broken & scared, Slocum
turned to an aid & said -- "for
Gods' sake send in some three year
troops!" ..So the 7th Ohio & 28th
Pa vols of Geary's command was
sent in. They remained until ordered out. The rebels followed but
were checked by our artillery.
About five o'clock a furious
attack was made on the 11th Corps
(formerly Siegels) by commenced by
Maj Gen Howard. Now occurred
one of the most disgraceful scenes of
the war. The 11th Corps made only a
feeble resistance -- broke, and
officers and men ran shamefully.
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A perfect panic took place
and thousands of fugitives came
back on my lines. I ordered my
men to fix bayonets and drive
them back, & we did stop & turn
back more than 1000 officers, &
men. Still, a vast number escaped
into the woods. The shells of the enemy
at this time came in from front
and rear. At this moment the
enemy attacked my pickets very
briskly, but were driven off. So
I had the rebels on my front and
the rebels and our stragglers on my rear.
The cowardice of the German troops
was ludicrous. They hid in the woods
-- forced their way into our rifle
pit. In fact, they seemed half scared
to death.
I have no hesitation in saying
that had our line broke at that time
the army would have been ruined! The
commander of Knapps battery came to
me and said "what are you going to
do?" "Stay here, Sir," said I. told him. "Then
I'll stay with you," said he. I tied
my red silk handkerchief around my
head & went along my lines, exhorting
every man to stand firm, & the men
answered with loud cheers, which
had the effect to shame some
of the fugitives & then & they
halted. Sickles Corps -- the 3rd
checked the rebels & held them
though they several times attacked
fiercely during the night, which
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was one of constant alarms. During
the night Reynolds Corps came up
& occupied a position to hold our
right & prevent the enemy turning our right flank.
Early Sunday morning the rebels attacked fiercely
front flank & rear -- for about
two hours the fighting was desperate
but they slowly drove our men
slowly back. French's Division of
the 2d Corps & Caldwells Brigade
& Brooke fought nobly, driving back
the rebels in disorder, until the
latter came on in overwhelming numbers. While the battle in the rear
was going on we had constant
attacks on our front & flank. Several times we were taken out of
our rifle pit to reinforce weak points
in our line, & marched over the
field under fire. The Brigade was
perfectly cool and steady.
Our forces were now
falling back along the whole line,
& the rebels came on shouting furiously. My command was again ordered from its position; We faced by
the rear rank, and marched back
some 200 yards to the crest of a
little hill. Geary's Division was now
on my left right flank, engaged with
the enemy, & in my front was
two. brass batteries & Petits [illegible]
battery of ten pd Parrotts
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all firing rapidly except on Brass battery
which was badly officered. The rebels
deployed from the woods in a line of
double columns closed in mass. They
halted, fronted & commenced to deploy
but were driven back by a severe
fire of grape & shell. I sighted
one gun after helping shove it to
the front. In a few moments
the enemy got a splendid rifle
battery into position, which fired
with wonderful accuracy. So heavy
was the fire that Capt Petit was compelled for the first time during the
war to limber up & leave -- but was
instantly ordered back. For about
40 minutes my command was under
the heaviest fire it ever experienced.
Every instant some one in each
Regt was hit. The air seemed full
of bursting shell. From our rear
from the left from the front came
a storm of missiles. Three times
I sent Lieut Fay to tell Gen Hancock that our left was defeated.
Geary's Division, being whipped
out, was retreating in disorder. All
the others had gone, and our situation was perilous in the extreme.
The artillery limbered up & ran
away, and not until a heavy line
of the enemy, cheering and firing
as it came on was within 300
yards of my flank and already engaged with the 5th Reg't did
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orders come to fall back. We faced
to the right & marched off -- but the
fire of the enemy from three directions
made a slight confusion, but only
for an instant. We marched steadily
after reaching the woods, though our
ranks thinned and shattered by grape, canister & rifle
balls. Had we delayed five minutes
more we should have been taken
prisoners or cut to pieces.
I do not understand why
Geary was not supported or reinforced. The day was not lost
if fresh troops & artillery and been
thrown in. I had no idea that
a retreat had been ordered. While lying
under that awful fire my belief was
that a fresh division & some artillery
would soon be sent to aid us, &
I so stated to our men. The enemy
might have been greatly injured if
not entirely checked by a little vigorous action.
The conduct of Maj Gen
Couch was splendid. Both he and
Gen Hancock remained until
the batteries limbered up. Gen Couch
was slightly wounded and Gen Hancock's horse killed.
We might, in my
opinion have fallen back on the Fredericksburg road and connected with
Sedgwick. The 2d Corps formed
near the front line to cover the retreat
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of the army, & only fell back about
half a mile. The other corps were previously
in position -- showing that a retreat had
been ordered early in the day -- perhaps
during the night. Our position was
now as follows:
[Hooker diagram two]
Such was the position but not
so far down the river. We only held
from to US ford to Banks [Ford] -- I have made
the circle large to show the position
of the troops. We had barely formed
line when the artillery of the enemy
opened upon us -- throwing shell or
shrapnel -- doing great damage.
Men sent for water were knocked
over, & the trees stripped of their
limbs over our heads. Our position
was too strong, however to be successfully
assailed by infantry. The instant the
shelling ceased, we commenced to throw
up field works along the entire line,
& by dark we were well situated.
From this time until orders
came to fall back we were in con-
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stant alarms -- picket firing and
shelling every short few hours. The
enemy had excellent range, but fired
to high for the front line. The reserves,
however, in the woods back were greatly
injured. Several strong attacks were
made at different points but in
each case beaten off. About midnight of the 6th orders came to
move. We did not get away until
4 oclock, but where once in on
the move pushed rapidly along. The
mud was half leg deep most of
the way. All along the forest which
extended about 4 miles to the
river were columns of troops
looking dirty, fatigued and anxious.
Let me here record that on the
afternoon of the 6th, during a furious
shelling Brig Gen T. F. Meagher lay
among the enlisted men of Company G
of my regiment -- evidently badly scared.
As soon as the firing ceased, he ran
as fast as possible to the left and
rear where he had a private fortification constructed.
Thousands of troops
were massed at the bridges over
the Rappahannock. We crossed
and marched the same night to
our old camp -- weary, sad and
almost [illegible]. Our guard
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had failed. Gen Hooker was
completely outgeneralled -- his magnificent
army badly handled -- his artillery not
massed -- not half of it used and could
not be, on account of the woods. The
9 mos & two years troops whose time
drew near a close could not be
made to stand fire. They wavered,
broke -- in some cases threw away
their arms, in all cases the stragglers
told the old stories -- that they were "all
cut to pieces!. The amount of straggling
was fearful, especially in the 11th
& 12th Corps.
My own Reg't lost 27 in
all, Maj Cross was badly wounded -My Brigade lost about 200.
Hooker has not the amount
of brains necessary to manage a
vast army. In generalship we fall
far behind the rebels, & since McClellan
left the Army of the Potomac, its organization has been extremely defective. Hookers popularity lay
chiefly in the soft bread, potatoes
& onions he issued. The army
never believed him to be a great
commander -- never. His failure
was predicted by thousands of officers & soldiers -- from the first
day he started.
I have endeavored in the
above narrative to state only facts,
with as few opinions as possible.
E. E. Cross
Col 5th NHV

